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WHAT DOES JUSTICE REQUIRE FOR THE VICTIMS OF
KATRINA AND SEPTEMBER 11?
John G. Culhane*

I. INTRODUCTION
What do we owe the victims of misfortune? Perhaps because the
question seems too difficult to answer when asked so generally, most
discussions concerning the obligation to assist such victims focus on
specific events (such as terrorism, crime, or natural disasters)' or more
narrowly defined social problems (such as lack of access to health care
and insurance). 2 Thus, the responses are similarly constrained and
often fail to take account of broader issues of overall fairness.
Although this impulse is understandable and perhaps even
politically necessary, we should not settle for the results of such a
"practical" approach. In earlier works, I have argued for separating the
harms caused by social risks-those borne by everyone in a society,
such as terrorism 3 and contagious diseases-from harms resulting from
* Professor

of Law, Widener University School of Law; Lecturer, Yale University

School of Public Health. Thanks, as always, to Jean Eggen; this time for her insights
on the immunity issues, among other things. I would also like to thank Michele
Goodwin for organizing the symposium that produced this paper, and for inviting me
to participate. Janine Hochberg's research effort was outstanding, both substantively
and in terms of sheer speed. This article would have been much the poorer without
her. Thanks to David Girasole for his patience and support. This article was supported
by a research grant from Widener University School of Law, for which I also give
thanks.
1 For example, many articles and symposia have been dedicated to analyzing the
events of September 11 and our obligation to compensate its victims. See, e.g.,
Symposium, After Disaster: The September 1 1 h Compensation Fund and the Future
of Civil Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 205-830 (2003); Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for
Fairnessin Compensating Victims of September 11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 573 (2001).
2 See, e.g.,

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,

HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND

PROBLEMS 473-475 (5th ed. 2004) (succinctly defining the problem and providing
useful list of sources further discussing the issue).
3 One might question the conclusion that terrorism is a social risk, because the
terrorists themselves are of course culpable actors of the worst sort. And if these
terrorists had survived and could be made to pay, full compensation would indeed be
appropriate. Calling terrorism a "social risk" is a way of highlighting the public safety
and health issue that it presents, because even a fully competent government cannot
prevent all terrorist attacks any more than it can, even if vigilant, stop the spread of
infectious diseases. On the ineffectiveness of suits against foreign governments that
sponsor terrorism, see generally Jennifer Elise Plaster, Cold Comfort and a Paper
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what might broadly be called wrongful conduct.4 Such separation is
necessary because justice imposes different requirements on
compensation in the two cases. Inasmuch as social risks are those
shared by all, compensating those who suffer harm from them is
constrained by the requirements of distributive justice, which mandates
that the needs and resources of the entire society be taken into account.
On the other hand, when injury is caused by a private actor's faultbased conduct, the person harmed can call upon the full resources of
the culpable party for compensation.
A particularly dramatic example of what can happen when this
division is insufficiently respected is the September 11 Victim
Compensation Fund.5 Driven by the need to do something for those
whose family members were killed by the tragic events of that day,
Congress compensated those afflicted by the terrorist attacks almost as
fully as though it was compensating tort victims. 6 Payouts to aggrieved
families went as high as $7 million,7 and the overall cost to taxpayers- 8
because the "fund" was such in name only-was just over $7 billion.
Singling out this class of victims for tort-like compensation served no
principle of distributional fairness.
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath stand in stark contrast.
Although the hurricane itself was not a preventable event, the
Tiger: The (Un)Availability of Tort Compensation for Victims of International
Terrorism, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 533 (2004).
4 John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1027, 1027 (2003); John. G. Culhane, Sandbags Full of Money: Victim
Compensation after 9/11, DISSENT, Fall 2003, at 40.

5 The September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 is codified in Title IV of
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 401409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-241 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101).
6 As discussed in Part II., payments did not in fact reach those provided by tort law,
but they were still far in excess of what might be justified under principles of
distributive justice. See Culhane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note 4, at 1039-43
(discussing payments under the Fund).
7 See September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Compensation for
at
available
Victims,
Deceased
(last
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/paymentsdeceased.html
visited Sept. 1, 2006) (illustrating that up to $7.1 million was given to surviving
family members). Personal injury awards went higher still; September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, Compensation for Personal Injury Victims, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/payments-injury.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2006) (showing awards up to $8.6 million).
8 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE
SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 109, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
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devastation of New Orleans could have been averted had government
on all levels not failed miserably in a host of ways: construction and
maintenance of the levee system; 9 planning for evacuation;1° and
communication and rapid-response efforts once evacuation became
Yet the federal government has come up with no
necessary.
compensation system on the order of the Victim Compensation Fund,
even though the federal government's fault is clear and perhaps even
conceded in this case.12
This Article explores the differences between our responses to
Katrina and to the events of September 11, and makes the argument
that Katrina victims have a much stronger claim to governmental
compensation than did those affected by the events of September 11.
Yet our national response is likely to remain unsatisfactory.
In Part II, I discuss the distinctions between corrective and
distributive justice, arguing that the creation of the Victim
Compensation Fund, for all of its admirable intentions, constituted a
failure to appreciate those differences. The victims of September 11, as
far as was known at the time the Fund was established, had no
legitimate claim to generous government payouts.
But what of the victims of Katrina? The simplest conclusion
government, through its ineptitude, caused much
here-that
unnecessary suffering and must therefore pay damages as would any
defendant in a private suit (for tort)-is not necessarily the best one.
Part III begins by making the case that the federal government was
indeed negligent (or worse) in allowing Katrina to flood New Orleans.
I then discuss both the practical and more theoretical implications of
these findings for government's obligation to compensate. For even
when government negligently performs a task that results in personal
injury, death, or property damage, it is different from other actors. I

9 See infra Part III.A.
10 Congressional testimony,

memoranda and e-mails released months after Katrina

struck, and conflicting accounts offer a complex but undoubtedly dismal picture of
the evacuation effort on all levels. See, e.g., Bill Walsh, Panelists Assail gaps in
Evacuation, DAILY TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 15, 2005, at 1; Joby Warrick et al.,
Katrina Documents Released - Louisiana Governor Did Seek Help Early, FORT
WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Dec. 5, 2005, at A9; Spencer S. Hsu et al., Documents Highlight
Bush-Blanco Standoff, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2005, at A10-11.
"

See Hsu et al., supra note 10, at A10 (discussing this issue); Eric Lipton et al,

Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at
Al, A28 (discussing same).

12See infra Part III.A.
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argue that those differences counsel caution in applying principles of
tort law to government's actions.
Part IV picks up from this recognition of the limits of theorizing
in these cases, and sketches out a program for dealing sympathetically
and humanely with the Katrina victims while respecting the claims that
others have on government funding. In this Part, I encourage a
flexibility of response that works towards allowing the survivors to
flourish, in the best sense of that word. One practical advantage of
compensation over tort here is that compensation systems continue to
attend to facts as they change; tort, by contrast, has done with the
parties once the suit is over. 13 So changing facts, post-judgment,
seldom lead to changed outcomes.
Plaintiffs are usually
overcompensated or undercompensated when the injuries continue past
trial. At least, then, government payouts should not provide funds for
injuries not suffered, but may be justified in continuing for as long as
necessary.
Part IV concludes by noting that political and practical
difficulties combine with theoretical problems to make a tight fit
between injury and payment unlikely.
Therefore, planning and
prevention assume heightened importance as ways of avoiding these
problems in the first place. If Katrina's human cost leads to increased
governmental accountability, perhaps that accountability will translate
into greater efforts to avert tragedies like these in the first place.
Events since Katrina, though, do not provide much cause for optimism.

13

The statement in the text is oversimplified, as recent developments in tort payment

structures now sometimes mean that courts may continue to be involved in
supervising, say, periodic payments.
Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort
Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659, 672-73 (2003). But periodic payment statutes
typically do not allow courts to revisit the underlying decision regarding the overall
amount of money to be collected by the plaintiff. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.78
(2005); IDAHO CODE § 6-1602 (2004). Family law matters, such as custody,
visitation, and support obligations, are among the examples of law's willingness to
attend to changing facts. This Article suggests a similarly flexible approach to
compensating (in the broadest sense of that term) the victims of Katrina.
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II. TWO KINDS OF JUSTICE
Aristotle was the first to recognize that what is called "justice" is in4
reality two different concepts, each applicable to a different sphere.,
"Distributive justice" refers to the overall allocation of goods in a
particular society, while the subject of "corrective justice" is the
assignment of rights and liabilities among private persons. Each of
these will be described briefly, in turn.
The work of distributive justice is done by government, which
decides how much and to whom goods shall be allocated. However
vast the overall resources of a society are, they are not limitless.
Therefore, distributions of necessity involve proportion; more to some
means less to others. But who is entitled to what? These decisions are
matters of substantial and legitimate discussion and debate. Aristotle
had this to say: "[E]veryone agrees that justice in distribution must be
in accordance with some kind of merit, but not everyone means the
same by merit..

,15

Today, the nub of the debate might be captured by comparing
libertarianism and social liberalism. While libertarians believe that
well-functioning markets are the best determinants of overall wealth,
social liberals favor a degree of "engineering" to ensure that all citizens
share (to some unagreed-upon extent) the goods that society
produces. 16 Neutrality on this fundamental issue is impossible; letting
the market "decide" on distributions is just as value-laden as making
those decisions through government. Thus, government may decide
that victims of terrorism, nuclear accident, or illness are entitled to
compensation, but these decisions are in principle always subject to
scrutiny for overall fairness. Because all distributions are potentially in
play, good reasons are needed for compensating those who suffer
misfortune.
The typical federal approach to disaster relief (leaving aside
Katrina for the moment) provides a good model for imitation. Under

'4 The concept of justice encompasses a wide area in ethics and political theory,
including the notions of retributive justice (as a theory of punishment), social justice
(concerning issues of access to historically disenfranchised groups such as racial and

sexual minorities and women), and the two areas of justice with which this article is
concerned: distributive and corrective justice.
"5ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK V 86 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans.,
Cambridge University Press 2000).
16 These points are discussed more fully in Culhane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note
4, at 1064-68.
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7
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,'
once a "major disaster" has been declared, federal assistance (housing
and cash grants) become available, but only for those needs the victims
are unable to meet through other sources-including private
insurance-and only to a modest extent.18 Thus, the government shows
the compassion to provide a basic safety net but avoids creating
incentives for people to under-insure and impliedly recognizes the
claims that other needs have on the treasury. Of course, it is always
debatable just how much compensation should be awarded to meet
such basic needs. For example, although housing is a "basic need,"
large estates are not replaced; housing grants are limited to $26,200
dollars. 19
The Victim Compensation Fund, by contrast, ignored these
overall distributional issues, instead treating the victims much as
though they were successful tort plaintiffs (i.e., granting full recovery
for economic loss). In addition to being unprecedented in their
generosity, Fund payments did not count charitable compensation
against recovery. Further, the legislation creating the Fund provided no
upper limit on recovery. In practice, the awards were at least somewhat
less inequitable. First, the Fund did count private insurance payments

against recovery.

More centrally for present purposes, the Fund's

Special Master charged with implementation of the payouts simply
decided to impose a defacto cap on payments; although the higher-end

'742 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2006).
18Id. §
'9

5133.

See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Release HQ-05-236, Nearly $690 Million in

Assistance Helping More Than 330,000 Families Displaced by Katrina, Sept. 10,
(last
2005, available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18765

visited Sept. 6, 2006). This amount "includes the $2,000 immediate needs assistance
and $2,358 transitional housing assistance programs." See Fed. Emergency Mgmt.
Agency, Release HQ-05-316, More Than $2.3 Billion In Expedited FEMA Aid
Already Delivered To Hurricane Katrina Victims, (Oct. 2, 2005), at

http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19342 (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
This is not to be confused with the amount that might be recovered under the National
Flood Insurance Plan. This amount, which can reach $250,000 in building coverage
and $100,000 in personal property coverage, is discussed infra at note 23 and
accompanying text.
20 This provision was especially important in the case of life insurance policies, which
are generally not subject to subrogation claims. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham &
Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: CollateralSources Under the September
11 Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 591, 599 (2003) (discussing this

issue).

2007]

WHAT JUSTICE REQUIRES

awards could have been in the scores of millions, no award exceeded
$8.6 million. 2 '
Nonetheless, the creation of the Fund showed Congressional
failure to understand the differences between distributive and corrective
justice. Full tort payment would be appropriate against any party
deemed to be sufficiently at fault for the events of September 11,
possibly including: the terrorists (most obviously but least likely to be
accountable in this case); those responsible for security at airports; and
But
the designers and engineers of the World Trade Towers.
government, assuming it was not at fault, was not such a party and
should not have volunteered to behave as one, especially since "it" has
no funds of its own, only those entrusted to it by the governed.22 As we
shall see, the government was indeed substantially at fault in
connection with events pre-, during, and post-Katrina.
What justifies full compensation in torts cases? The complex
and contested answer moves the discussion from distributive to
corrective justice. But corrective justice itself is not the dominant
justification for tort law today. Instead, most view tort in instrumental
terms; i.e., justified to the extent that it serves some extrinsic purpose
(although, of course, the injured party will be compensated in the
process). Some instrumentalists believe those injured by the wrongful
conduct of others are entitled to compensation because they, and others,
will be deterred from similar actions in the future. Others prefer
justifications based on overall economic efficiency. For example, a
$1,000 precaution that would save only $500 in accident costs should
not be undertaken, because doing so would be economically inefficient.
If instrumental goals are dominant, however, we should simply
abandon tort law (which does a rather poor job at achieving any of the
goals desired of it) in favor of a compensation system. Thus, tort is
justified only to the extent that it gives priority to corrective justice.23
21

See September

l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Compensation for

Deceased Victims, supra note 7. For a discussion of Feinberg's view as to how much
compensation should be awarded, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator, THE NEW
YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 44, 47.

There is an argument that the Fund was justified as a quid pro quo, because those
who availed themselves of it gave up their right to sue. But the intent of the trade-off
was to bail out the airline industry, not to protect government against suit. By
"getting in the middle" of the transaction, the government made distributive decisions
22

that seem difficult to justify. See Culhane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note 4, at

1043-52, 1088-91 (discussing this point in detail).
Pure corrective justice theorists believe that no departure from tort doctrine that
compromises the intrinsic relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is
23
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Aristotle again provides the starting point for considering the proper
realm of this form of justice; corrective justice does not "care" about
the overall holdings of those within the society, nor, for that matter, the
antecedent (pre-accident) holdings or character of the parties vis-a-vis
each other: "[I]t makes no difference whether it is a good person who
has defrauded a bad or a bad person a good ... [t]he law looks only to
as equals, if one
the difference made by the injury, and treats the parties
24
it."
suffering
other
the
and
injustice,
is committing
This insight has been given greater content through the
Kantian/Hegelian notion of the abstract equality of persons, most fully
developed by Ernest Weinrib through a number of influential
writings.25 Whatever inequalities may exist between them, two people

are equal qua holders of whatever they hold at the moment preceding
their interaction. When the "defendant [chooses] to use up [the]
plaintiff's resources for his own ends[,] ' '26 such conduct is wrongful, in
the language of corrective justice. Typically, negligence (or worse) is
the threshold of culpability required to force the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff, thereby restoring the balance of holdings that
existed before the harm was suffered.27 Further, because no imbalance
justified. Ernest Weinrib is the staunchest defender of this position. See, e.g., Ernest
J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 449 (1987)
("Adjudication [cannot], therefore, properly be the mechanism for promotion of any
collective goal aside from the disclosure and vindication of the normativity immanent
to the interaction of persons"). But such doctrinal rigidity risks short-changing the
very goal it sets for itself, which is (usually stated as) the restoration of the imbalance
created when the "doer" (defendant) acts at least negligently towards the "sufferer"
(plaintiff). Ernest J.Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE
L.J. 277, 280 (1994). A lively question involves just how much manipulation to basic
tort doctrine can be done before corrective justice becomes unrecognizable as such.
See Culhane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note 4, at 1073, 1074-76. I have taken the
position, discussed further herein, that even well-designed compensation systems can
serve corrective justice goals, if that term is understood broadly. See id. at 1084-88.
24 ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, at 154.
25 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Weinrib,
Causation and Wrongdoing, supra note 23; Ernest J.Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77
IOWA L. REV. 403, 413 (1992); Ernest J.Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice,
50 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2002); Weinrib, Gains and Losses, supra note 23; Ernest J.
Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37 (1983).
Weinrib's work was the subject of a Symposium. See Symposium, Legal Formalism,
16 HARv. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 579 (1993).
26 James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 131, 157 (David G.Owen ed., 1995).
27 Corrective justice "does not permit strict liability in general, because the absence of
fault means that the defendant has not willfully acted to the detriment of the plaintiffs
interests; that the defendant has injured the plaintiff and not vice-versa is thus purely
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has been created in the absence of actual harm to the plaintiff,
wrongdoing simpliciter is insufficient for liability; only a showing that
caused injury gives the plaintiff standing to pursue a
the defendant
28
claim.
Some commentators have recognized that a rigorous application
of corrective justice, while perhaps theoretically attractive, can lead to
unjust results, and have therefore supported modifications of liability
rules in particular classes of cases. 29 For example, where defectively
manufactured products result in personal injury, the overall goals of
corrective justice are arguably well served by a strict liability rule
rather than by requiring plaintiff to prove negligence. The opacity of
the manufacturing process and the plaintiffs lack of access to
information combine to create a situation where strict liability leads to a
more just result over the run of cases.30
But whatever modifications corrective justice proponents may
or may not be willing to accept, it remains clear that the goals and
animating principles of the two kinds of justice are distinct. For while
corrective justice only comes into play where a specific act and actor
are identified, distributive justice presses its case in every circumstance.
Take away the suffering caused by the events of September 11, or by
Katrina, and those who lived and worked in the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and the Gulf Coast would yet have claims-different
claims, to be sure, but claims nonetheless-to their share of the overall
"goods" of society. To be pointed, does distributional fairness require
the poor residents of New Orleans' Ninth Ward to receive access to
free health care? Inserting Katrina into the equation moves the facts
and likely our sympathies in favor of providing such access, but the
question of just distributions would exist whether or not the hurricane
ever struck. This point again underscores the error of the September 11
Fund. To repeat the example: Were the victims of September 11 more
deserving (however that term is meant) of multi-million dollar payouts
than poor citizens are of basic health care? Given that the government
was not the wrongful actor in the September 11 case, the question

coincidental and does not permit the plaintiff to call upon the defendant's resources to
restore what was lost." Culhane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note 4, at 1073.
28
29

Weinrib, Causationand Wrongdoing, supra note 23, at 429.
See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass

Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 232-36 (Gerald J. Postema ed.,

2001) (stating that nothing about the allocation of the burden of proof is intrinsic to
corrective justice).
30

See Cuihane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note 4, at 1077-82.
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cannot be avoided; nor can the answer that this was not an occasion for

corrective justice.
But what is the appropriate response when government does
create or greatly magnify the suffering? This Article now moves to a
discussion of that issue.
III. GOVERNMENTAL FAULT RELATED TO HURRICANE
KATRINA
As has been exhaustively documented and discussed, government's

incompetence (and worse) surrounding the events of Hurricane Katrina
occurred at all levels-federal, state and local. According to reports at
the time and efforts to explain the failures later, a large part of the
problem was inaction and poor decision-making in the events
immediately preceding and following the hurricane: failure to prepare
for and execute the evacuation of New Orleans; delayed rescue efforts;
and the maddening inability to deliver basic human services such as
food, medical attention, and housing in a timely way. FEMA Director
Michael Brown, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin engaged in a circular and dispiriting "blame
game" that only strengthened the perception that all 3levels of
government had failed miserably in the time of greatest crisis. '
Certainly a case could be made for liability against any and all
of these entities. Of course, issues of sovereign immunity would arise,
as would questions involving the duty vel non of government to
individual citizens. Yet it is reasonable to suppose that recovery would
32
In this
be possible in at least some number of individual lawsuits.
Part, though, I mostly ignore suits against the city and state
governments to concentrate on claims against the United States.
31See supranotes 10-11
32 See, e.g., Complaint,

I

and accompanying text.
Peyroux v. United States, No. 06-2317 (E.D. La. Apr. 28,

2006), 2006 WL 1327905 (showing recovery based on failure of levee system);
Complaint for Damages Caused by the Design, Construction, Operation, and
Maintenance of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, Robinson v. United States, No. 062268 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 2006); Post-KatrinaVictim's Son Sues, Cm. TRIBUNE, Aug.
18, 2006, at 7 (reporting on a wrongful death suit against New Orleans and Louisiana
filed on behalf of 91-year-old Ethel Freeman, who died in her wheelchair during the
4-day wait for buses outside the convention); Sandy Davis, Family Sues Acadian in
Evacuation Failure,BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Aug. 29, 2006 (describing a reliance-

and contract-based suit against ambulance company and St. Bernard parish for failure
to evacuate an 83-year-old woman and her quadriplegic son who were drowned in
their home).
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further narrow the discussion by focusing on the durable precautions
(e.g., levee construction and maintenance) that were insufficient to
prevent the flooding that changed New Orleans forever. These present
perhaps the cleanest case of negligence (or worse) and therefore
provide a good analytical model for assessing the claims that injured
citizens have against government misfeasance.
I begin by presenting the case that the federal government was
indeed at fault in the construction, design, and maintenance of both the
hurricane protection levee system and the Mississippi River-Gulf
Outlet ("MR-GO").
This Article then briefly discusses some
preliminary problems with suits by private parties affected by the
hurricane before turning to a more detailed treatment of a deeper
problem with holding government accountable for its misconduct,
however intuitively appealing doing so might be.
A. Governmental Fault in the Construction, Design, and
Maintenance of the Hurricane Protection System and the MR-GO
1. Sources
Currently, the major sources of information pertaining to engineering
failures in the New Orleans hurricane protection system are a final draft
report of the Army Corps of Engineers' Interagency Performance
Evaluation Taskforce ("IPET") and a final report produced by the
Independent Levee Investigation Team ("ILIT"). In the IPET report,
the Corps claims responsibility for failure of the protection system
while maintaining that it found "no evidence of government or
contractor negligence or malfeasance." 34 IPET avoids examination of
13 Constructed

by the Army Corps of Engineers, the MR-GO is a navigational channel
that connects the Gulf of Mexico and the City of New Orleans. It is essentially a 66mile short-cut that obviated the need to navigate the twists of the Mississippi River.
Touted as an economic boon to the City of New Orleans, the MR-GO, completed in
1963, initially caused an uptick in local employment, but traffic on it has slowed over
the years, and many question both its economic and environmental desirability. See,
e.g.,

LSU

AgCenter.com,

http://www.Isuagcenter.con/en/environment/conservation/wetlands/Closing+the+Mis
sissippi+River+Gulf+Outlet+MRGO+Environmental+and+Economic+Considerations
.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2006). The extent to which the environmental degradation
wrought by the MR-GO may have contributed to the flooding of New Orleans is
discussed in Part III.A.
34 1 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NEW
ORLEANS AND SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: DRAFT
FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TASK FORCE 5
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the Corps' decision-making processes that led to failures because a
separate team is working on a Hurricane Katrina Decision Chronology
Study for the Corps. The ILIT report, as well as newspaper accounts
and Senate testimony from ILIT investigators, generally agree with
IPET's technical conclusions but go into somewhat more detail about
institutional failures within the Corps. The ILIT was headed by Dr.
Raymond Seed, a civil engineer, and the University of California,
Berkeley, and is the product of an exhaustive (and pro bono) effort by
some thirty-four researchers and seventeen professional engineers,
drawn from academia, private firms, and government agencies. The
team had extensive forensic experience with earthquakes, hurricanes,
dam and levee failures, as well as with completely man-made disasters
such as the space shuttles Challenger and Columbia, and the ill-fated
oil tanker Exxon Valdez.
The discussion that follows highlights some of the major
statements and findings of both reports, supplemented with
congressional testimony and other, less technical accounts. Neither the
Corps' own assessment, nor the ILIT report, discusses issues relating to
the MR-GO, however. Accordingly, this Article pieces together some
of the allegations and assessments of how the breach of the MR-GO's
own levees contributed to the flooding. In both cases, my goal is to
provide a sense of the pervasiveness of the failures, as well as the
complexity of sorting out such issues as responsibility for the
devastation and the difficulty of proving causation.35 These problems
could present formidable obstacles for Katrina plaintiffs.
2. Describing the Failures of the Hurricane Protection System
IPET identified fifty "major breaches" where structural failure occurred
in the hurricane protection system, and attributed four to failures at
floodwall foundations (without overtopping), with the remainder
36
caused by overtopping and resulting scour erosion on levee walls.
(2006), available at http://ipet.wes.army.mil (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION]. This conclusion seems
incredible on its face, given the factual findings made by the Army Corps itself (let
alone the ILIT findings). While it may have been entirely appropriate to make no
statement concerning fault, denying has the effect of suggesting the opposite
conclusion.
35 On a related note, the federal government's failures were a mix of policy, funding,
and implementation decisions. On the immunity questions raised, see infra notes 96108 and accompanying text.
36 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 27.
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Overtopping of certain levees led to breaches when waves gained two
to three times their velocities traveling down the back (protected) sides
of the levees and were then able to erode away the back walls.3 7 The
same effect caused failure of 1-wall floodwalls 38 where the force of
overtopping waves created trenches at the bases of walls' protected
sides where they entered the levee fill, undermining support for wall
structures. 39 The Corps determined that its I-wall design was simply
unable to survive overtopping.4n
Several design and construction flaws contributed to erosionassociated failures. The Corps used a minimum factor of safety of 1.3
for levee design and stability, a standard, according to ILIT, that was
created primarily for levees built in agricultural areas with small
populations. 41 ILIT considered the standard "far too low" for a system
intended to protect a major metropolitan area.4 2 Choice of construction
materials was a crucial factor in creating erosion breaches, as there was
a strong correlation between erosion-associated breaches and the use of
erodible levee materials such as hydraulic fill, which included
significant sand and silt content.43 By contrast, clay levees generally
performed well, even where they were subject to overtopping. 4
Erodible levee materials were used at some locations because they

3' R.B. SEED, ET AL., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW

29, 2005, ch. 2, at 10;
at
available
(2005),
6
at
4
ch.
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/1 1/leveereport-prelim.pdf (last
ORLEANS LEVEE SYSTEMS IN HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUGUST

visited Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]; R.B. SEED, ET AL.,
INDEPENDENT LEVEE INVESTIGATION TEAM, INVESTIGATION OF THE PERFORMANCE
OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOOD PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN HURRICANE KATRINA ON
available at
(2006),
REPORT
FINAL
DRAFT
29,
2005:
AUGUST

http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/-new_orleans/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
See also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 28.
38 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 19,

ILIT, INVESTIGATION].

fig.3. I-walls are straight sheet pilings driven vertically into a levee structure and
capped with cement where the wall emerges above the levee.
39 Id. at 31.
40 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at vol.
5, p. 80.
41 ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 12, p. 14.
42
1Id. at ch. 8, p. 34.
43 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at

INVESTIGATION, supra note 37,
4, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION,

29, 30 fig. 15; vol. 5, p. 74; ILIT,
5, p. 72.

28-

at ch. 15, p. 2.
supra note 34, at vol.
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could be dredged near construction,45 presumably at a lower cost than
transporting materials to the site. Cost also appears to have played a
role in the Corps' failure to take a sufficient number of boring samples
to adequately evaluate the foundational soil. Such undersampling
resulted in miscalculations of levee stability because subsurface
conditions tuned out to be less stable than assumed.46 These findings
were supported by testimony stating that, during the construction
process, at least one outside contractor questioned the underlying soil
softness and its effect on I-wall stability.47
Investigators from ILIT suggested that "relatively inexpensive"
upgrades to the levee and floodwall systems, including reinforcing
protected sides with concrete or paving, could have improved
performance and prevented at least some of the failures.48 ILIT also
found the use of compacted clay fill instead of highly erodible dredged
materials to build levees, along with levee armoring in anticipation of
the storm, could have avoided erosion-associated breaches and kept
flooding below catastrophic levels.49
Some I-walls failed even when overtopping did not occur.
Pressure on the water side of I-walls pushed the above-ground sections
towards the land side, creating a gap between the I-wall and the levee50
fill where water could seep underneath the implanted sheet piling.
The increased water loads on the walls, combined in some cases with
movement of the levee's underlying sand layer and erosion of levee
support caused by the entering water, separated levee structures and led
to complete breaches. 5 '
Further, the hurricane protection system was constructed below
its originally authorized height as a result of miscalculations in the
45 ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 15, p. 2.
46

ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 8, pp. 28-30.

47 Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?: Hearing Before the Comm on

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (written
testimony of Ivor Li. Van Heerden, Head, State of Louisiana Forensic Data Gathering
Team)
[hereinafter
Hearing],
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&Hearing
ID=290 (last visited Sept. 20, 2006) (GPO has not yet printed hearing publication);
Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design
Flaws, WASH. POST, Oct. 24 2005, at Al.
48 Hearing, supra note 47, at 3 (written testimony of Raymond B. Seed on behalf of
the NSF-Sponsored Levee Investigation Team); ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37,
at ch. 15, pp. 3-4.
49 ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 15, p. 3.
50 U.S. ARMy CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 30.
51

-
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initial construction process, and it has been further lowered by rapid
subsidence. 52 However, it is unclear to what extent, if any, this loss of
to the
height and resulting elimination of design allowances contributed
53
surges.
storm
Katrina's
of
height
the
given
system's failure,
Additional localized problems affected certain areas, in
particular the 17th Street Canal. I-wall sheet pilings at some breach
sites were not driven deep enough at construction to prevent underseepage from the adjacent bodies of water they were intended to block,
54 which is particularly notable given the underflow failure
mechanism. 55 Residents on the protected side of the 17th Street Canal
reported ground wetness on dry days pre-Katrina. 56 In some locations,
including the 17th Street Canal levee, the practice of taking relatively
few, widely-spaced soil samples and extrapolating based upon their
results (discussed above) resulted in inaccurate assessments of I-wall
stability. 57 The sheet pilings of I-walls constructed along the 17th
Street Canal during the 1990s were driven in, removed because of an
oncoming storm, and then re-driven into their original positions, a
process which weakened the underlying soils. 58 In at least one location
into the ground to form I(in St. Bernard Parish), sheet piling driven
59
concrete.
with
capped
never
was
walls

52

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION supra note 34, at 17.

53 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34,

at vol.
2, p. 2.
54 Hearing, supra note 47, at 2-5 (written testimony of Ivor Li. Van Heerden, Head,
State of Louisiana Forensic Data Gathering Team) (noting problems with inadequate

sheet piling depth at the 17' Street Canal, London Avenue East and West, and
Industrial Canal breaches); ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 15, p. 3.
55 The IPET website includes several Corps Engineer Manuals, including the 1994
manual for Design of Sheet Pile Walls (EM 1110-2-2504), which indicates that the
geotechnical investigation for wall systems should include information on underseepage for floodwalls, p. 3-1. See generally http://ipet/wes.army.mil (last visited
Nov. 1, 2006).
56 Hearing, supra note 47, at 2 (written testimony of Ivor LI. Van Heerden, Head,
State of Louisiana Forensic Data Gathering Team); Frank Langfitt, Residents Say
Levee Leaked Months Before Katrina, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 22, 2005,

available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=50
visited Sept. 20, 2006).

22 74

0

(last

57 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 30.

The Corps reports that this practice of averaging soil strengths based on few samples
was not employed throughout the system. Id. at 5.
58 Hearing, supra note 47, at 2 (written testimony of Ivor Ll. Van Heerden, Head,
State of Louisiana Forensic Data Gathering Team).
59
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 37, at ch. 4, p. 6.
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I-wall stability analyses undertaken in the design process did
not account for the formation of gaps between the walls and the levee
support or the effect of such gaps on floodwall strength 6 0 -in
examining the 17th Street Canal, for example, IPET found that
assuming the formation of gaps would have lowered calculated factors
of safety by approximately twenty-five percent. 6 ' ILIT noted that fully
researching and field-testing designs could have revealed occurrences
of gap-formation when I-walls were put under heavy water loads. 62 In
fact, the Corps failed to take action in response to an internal study
conducted in the 1980s and subsequent analysis in professional journals
showing the I-wall structures would experience gap 63separations that
allowed water to enter along and under the sheet piling.
In addition, particularly in New Orleans East, failures occurred
at points in the system where there was a transition between different
construction material or protection elevations. 64 ILIT found that
result of design choices
failures in transition areas were "as much the
' 65
itself.
surge
storm
the
as
engineering
and/or
3. Inadequacy of the Standard Project Hurricane
The hurricane protection system was designed to a Standard Project
Hurricane that roughly approximated a fast-moving Category 3 storm
66
ILIT indicated the Standard Project
passing close to the area.
enshrined
as
a benchmark that was not updated to
Hurricane became
reflect developments in technology or the possibility of more intense
hurricanes, 67 despite widespread concern about the probability of more
severe storms and the risks of hurricane-related flooding despite the
city's existing system. 68 The Standard Project Hurricane did not keep
pace with hurricane and flooding standards developed by private
60

U.S.

ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION supra note

34, at vol. 5,

pp. 26-28, 55.
.Id.
62 ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 15, p. 7.
63

1d.at ch. 8, p. 13.

64 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 37, at ch. 3, p. 4.
65 ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 15, p. 4.
67

REPORT, supra note 37, at ch. 1, p. 3.
ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 12, p. 13.

68

U.S. H.R. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR

66

PRELIMINARY

H.R. REP. No. 109-377, Levees, 89-91
at
available
No.
109-377],
H.R.
REP.
[hereinafter
(2006)
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/katrina.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA,
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industries69 and foreign nations designing structures subject to storm
damage.
Katrina's surge and wave generation potential greatly exceeded
that of the Standard Project Hurricane, 70 but it was able to overwhelm
the hurricane protection system while no more than a Category 3-as
one expert put it, Katrina did not even amount to "the Big One" New
Orleans had feared, yet the protection system had still proven wholly
inadequate.71
4. Bureaucratic Issues
Although the errors detailed above were manifest, they do not convey
the full story of the problem. The Army Corps of Engineers could only
do as much as its funding and authority permitted. Substantial roles
were played by funding shortages, as well as by the dysfunctions
created by the diffusion of responsibility between the federal, state, and
local governments. Some of the most significant of these are described
below.
After construction, operation, and maintenance of Corps flood
control projects is split among local organizations, which in the case of
New Orleans included parish levee boards and water and sewer
boards. 72 Both lack of coordination and outright discord among the
local authorities undermined maintenance of the system and likely
prevented upgrades that could have strengthened critical sections.
Maintenance and inspection procedures were often lax 74 and did not
address long-term problems such as tree growth on private property
threatened levee stability in
extending into levee embankments, which
75
uprootings.
the event of storm-related
Lack of authority to pursue using floodgates to close off several
canals also had an effect. The surge from Lake Pontchartrain raised
water levels in three drainage canals, including the 17th Street and
London Avenue Canals, which led to major breaches into the
ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 12, p. 12.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 21.
71 Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design
69
70

Flaws, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 24 2005, at Al.
72 H.R. REP. No. 109-377, supra note 68, at 87.
73 Id.

74 Gordon Russell, Levee Inspections Only Scratch the Surface, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 25, 2005, National at 1.

75 ILIT,

INVESTIGATION,

supra note 37, at ch. 8, pp. 12, 33.
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downtown basin. 76 ILIT found that floodgates-rather than lining them
with levees and floodwalls-should have been used to close off those
canals; this was a proposal the Corps pursued for years." ILIT faulted
"dysfunctional interaction" between the local levee board and the local
water and sewerage board for preventing the floodgate plan.78
There were also reports of deficiencies caused by the lack of
coherent oversight of the system as a whole. 7 9 For example, ILIT noted
an ungated opening where a railway bridge crossed the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal, which was ineffectively sandbagged before
Hurricane Katrina arrived and admitted floodwaters during the storm.
The opening was just adjacent to a secure gate and flood control
structure that was maintained by 8 the Corps and withstood the storm
without breaching or overtopping. 0
Funding problems also contributed to the scope of the disaster.
For example, incomplete construction was a factor in the failure of a
section of levee along Lake Borgne in St. Bernard Parish; the Corps
had requested funding for the final stage of construction along eleven
miles of levee in the area, but the work was not completed and "large
portions" of the levees had not yet been built up to final design
height. 81 The section suffered "catastrophic" erosion that exacerbated
flooding in the area. 82
5. Purely Local Failure
Only sixteen percent of total pumping capacity was operational in the
city, and those pumping stations that did function were distributed
across four parishes and thus unable to concentrate their flood
reduction impact. 83 Pump inoperability was attributed to "evacuation84
of operators, loss of power, loss of cooling water, and flooding."
Some key pumping stations had been in operation since the early
1900s, and the pumps themselves were described by ILIT investigators
as "very old." 8 IPET concluded that the city's pump stations, which
76

Id. at ch. 15, p. 4.

77 Id.
78

id.

'9 PRELIMINARY REPORT,
80

Id. at 1.

supra note 37, at ch. 6, p. 2.

81 ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 15, p. 2.
82

id.

83 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION,
84 Id.
85 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 37, at ch. 6, p. 2.

supra note 34, at 8.
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6. Impact
IPET found that although flooding from rainfall and overtopping of the
system alone would have been significant, 88 breaches in levees and
floodwalls caused "[t]he majority, approximately two-thirds by volume,
89
of the flooding and half of the economic losses" related to the storm.
By modeling mean estimated fatalities, IPET estimated fatality
reductions in three different hypothetical scenarios as compared to
model fatality estimates based on actual conditions:
* A resilient floodwalls system in which no floodwall foundation
failures occurred (including erosion-associated failures from
overtopping), given actual pump availability, reduced estimated
fatalities by thirty-seven percent.
" A resilient levee system in which levees and floodwalls did not
breach, given actual pump availability, reduced estimated
fatalities by forty-eight percent.
* A resilient levees and pumps system in which no breaching
available reduced
occurred and full pump capacity was
9
estimated fatalities by sixty-five percent. 0
7. Another Problem: The MR-GO
As flooding began during Hurricane Katrina, levees along the MR-GO
were breached by Lake Borgne, sending water into St. Bernard Parish.
The MR-GO also channeled floodwaters towards the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway, where breaches and overtopping inundated New Orleans
East, and towards the Industrial Canal, which flooded the Ninth
Ward. 9 ' Both plaintiffs and some experts have alleged that the
86

U.S.

ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION,

supra note 34, at vol 6,

p. 28.
87 Id. at vol. 1, p. 32.
88 Id. at 7.
89 Id. at 4.
90 Id. at vol. 7, pp. 9-10, 125 tbl. 43. All scenarios accounted for overtopping and preKatrina wall and levee elevations.
91Bob Marshall, City's Fate Sealed in Hours, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May

14, 2006, at 1. It is difficult to capture the flooding through a written description,
especially for those unfamiliar with the local geography. Fortunately, the New

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[VOL. 10.2:177

intersection of the MR-GO and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway created

a "funnel effect," greatly increasing the force and speed of water flow
into the city and exacerbating the flooding in these areas. 92 Claims
have also been made that the MR-GO was negligently left "unarmored"
against breaches or erosion and that construction and maintenance of
the MR-GO illegally caused environmental damage, destroying
wetlands that would have served the city as a natural buffer against the
hurricane and hurricane-related flooding. 93 Because the government
appears to lack immunity for its design, construction, and
maintenance, 94 using the MR-GO to establish a chain of causation
encompassing significant portions of most devastated areas of New
Orleans appears to be the favored strategy in early suits. 95 These
claims, however, do not yet enjoy the same advantage as claims based
on the failure of the hurricane protection system--a devastating,
independent report by a team of unimpeachable experts.
B. From Fault to Liability
Although the negligence or perhaps even recklessness of the federal
government's involvement in the construction and maintenance of the
levees seems clear, the path to recovery for those affected by the
flooding caused by such negligence is fraught with pitfalls. I first
discuss these obstacles, and demonstrate that they should not lead to a

blanket denial of recovery. We must look beyond positive tort law,
Orleans Times-Picayune, which has done a heroic job of reporting on the hurricane
from the beginning, provides a useful visual chronology that lays out the flooding as
it occurred in various places along both the hurricane protection system and the MRGO. Ultimately, all of the flood waters ran together. See Dan Swenson, Flash Flood:
Hurricane Katrina's Inundation of New Orleans, August 29, 2005, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/katrina/graphics/flashflood.swf. (last visited
Sept. 20, 2006).
92 Complaint, Peyroux v. United States, supra note 32; Warrick & Grunwald, supra
note 71, at Al. The Army Corps of Engineers has disputed accounts of the MR-GO
acting as a funnel or "hurricane highway" during Katrina. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG'RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 6.
93 Complaint, Peyroux v. United States, supra note 32.
94 Case law specific to the MR-GO has found it to be a navigable waterway and not
part of the flood protection system; therefore, the government's actions regarding the
MR-GO are not immunized by the Flood Control Act. Graci v. United States, 456
F.2d 20, 26-28 (5th Cir. 1971).
95 Complaint, Peyroux v. United States, supra note 32; Complaint for Damages
Caused by the Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet, Robinson v. United States, supra note 32.
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however, in deciding whether such recovery would be consonant with
the principles of justice that inform this Article. In making this
argument, I do not mean to suggest that Katrina's victims should not
sue the government for their losses. They have already done so, can be
expected to continue doing so, and-given the unlikelihood of a
suitable legislative, compensatory response from Congress-should be
encouraged to do so. The practical priority should be taking care of the
victims, with the means of doing so coming in a distant second. My
aim here is to suggest that a compensation scheme, properly thought
through and funded, would be preferable for two reasons: It could
potentially do a better job of compensating, while also avoiding
troubling questions about the suitability of governmental tort liability
even for harms it has wrongly caused.
1. Practical Issues
At the outset, any successful suit would have to overcome the argument
from sovereign immunity. This ancient rule, stemming from the nowdiscarded perception that the "sovereign" (or king) can do no wrong,
prohibits citizens from recovering against the government for its
misdeeds. The federal government, however, has ceded some of its
immunity through the Federal Tort Claims Act, which permits injured
parties to bring suit against the government for the negligent acts of its
96
in
immunity
employees.
similar 97waiver
someinofthe
theSuits
claims
which oflikely
appliesis tofound
Admiralty Act A("SAA"),

96 The FTCA provides, in relevant par, that the government is liable "for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). The discussion that
follows is based solely on claims against the federal government. Negligent state and
local officials and policies also played a substantial role in the human suffering
wrought by Katrina, both in preparing for hurricanes and in actions taken during and
after the hurricane. See supra Part lI.A.5 (discussing this issue).
97 Much ink has already been spilled over whether the claims against the Army Corps
sound in admiralty or in tort. One strategy has been to plead jurisdiction in the
alternative. See Complaint, Robinson v. United States, No. 06-2268, Paragraph 7
(E.D. La. 2006), 2006 WL 1355628. The issue, simply stated, is whether the
circumstances causing damage bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activities. The question is extensively discussed in Parfait Family v. United States,
No. 05-4237, Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit (E.D. La. 2006), 2006 WL
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that have been or may yet be brought. These waivers, however, contain
an important limitation: Government is not liable when acting in a
discretionary capacity.
Determining what counts as a discretionary act has proven
difficult. Acts creating or grounded in policy are typically seen as
discretionary. One court tried to capture the reach of the exception as
follows:
Government actions can be classified along a spectrum,
ranging from those "totally divorced from the sphere of
policy analysis," such as driving a car, to those "fully
grounded in regulatory policy," such as the regulation and
oversight of a bank. But determining the appropriate place
on the spectrum for any given government action can be a
challenge. 98
Case law has established some guideposts, though, for
determining whether a given government action qualifies for the
exception. With particular application to the facts surrounding the
Army Corps' actions respecting Katrina, one court had this to say:
"[M]atters of scientific and professional judgment-particularly
considered to be susceptible
judgments concerning safety-are rarely
99
to social, economic, or political policy."
Although this language is heartening to those seeking recovery
for allegedly negligent design and maintenance issues, plaintiffs face a
more daunting obstacle. The federal government enjoys a broad grant
of immunity for suits related to flood control systems and activities
under the Flood Control Act of 1928 ("FCA"). 10 0 In sweeping
language, the FCA provides that "[n]o liability of any kind shall attach
to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or
1034829. Because the immunity issues are essentially the same for whichever statute
is ultimately held to apply, this Article does not attempt to resolve the issue.
98 Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
99 Id. at 1181.

'00 The FTCA waiver did not repeal the FCA immunity provision. See, e.g., Nat'l
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 274 (8th Cir. 1954) (finding no actual repeal

or repeal under the FTCA, which contains a list of repealed statutes that does not
include the FCA immunity provision). Plaintiffs proceeding under other statutory
waivers of immunity, such as the Suits in Admiralty Act, will likely also have to
contend with the immunity provision of the FCA. See Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co. v. United States, 966 F. Supp. 1453, 1458 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (stating that FCA
immunity analysis is identical whether suit lies under the FTCA or the SAA).
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flood waters at any place.'' 1 ' The FCA established a massive flood
control project for the Mississippi River Valley in response to severe
flooding in 1927, which killed two hundred people and displaced
700,000; as a kind of quid pro quo for entering the arena of flood
control on such a significant scale, government made itself immune
from damages. 10 2 A long line of cases applies the FCA's broad
wording to immunize the government against claims of negligence in
the design, construction operation, and maintenance of flood controlrelated projects, as well as extending FCA immunity to cover situations
involving both overland inundation and "underwater" problems, or
seepage.' 0 3 The major limitation on the FCA immunity provision is
that it pertains to "flood or flood waters," construed as "all waters
contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for
purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that such
projects cannot control."' 0 4 The FCA therefore does not shield the
government against tort claims pertaining to activities unconnected to
flood control projects-although courts have split on how much, if any,
101

33 U.S.C. § 702c. Under § 702c, immunity is waived "if... it shall be found that

upon any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it is impracticable to construct
levees, either because such construction is not economically justified or because such
construction would unreasonably restrict the flood channel, and lands in such stretch
of the river are subjected to overflow and damage

. . .

it shall be the duty of the

Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers to institute proceedings on behalf of
the United States Government to acquire either the absolute ownership of the lands..."
Plaintiffs in at least one post-Katrina suit over the failure of levees and floodwalls
have argued that the Corps knew or should have known that levee construction at the
failure sites was "impracticable" within the meaning of § 702c and breached an
affirmative duty to acquire ownership of threatened lands. Class Action Complaint,
Greer v. United States, No. 05-5709 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2005), 2005 WL 3720564.
102 Kent C. Hoffman, EnduringAnachronism: Arguments for the Repeal of the § 702c
Immunity Provision of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 79 TEX. L. REV. 791, 793
(2001); Sarah Juvan, The Federal Flood Control Act: CongressionalDevelopment of
a Modern-DayArk, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 303, 306 (1995).
103 See, e.g., United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604-608 (1986) (finding that §
702c was intended to provide broad immunity and barred suit involving concededly
negligent failure to warn of dangers related to operation of flood control projects);
Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1204-1205 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting
that immunity for government negligence under the FCA does not depend upon
whether natural conditions connected to flooding were unusual or not); Morici Corp.
v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 466, 492-493 (E.D. Cal. 1980), affd, 681 F.2d 645 (9th
Cir. 1982) (finding immunity for seepage related to operation of multi-purpose river
project which was partially intended for flood control; FCA bars liability "even
negligence
when... damages may have been caused by governmental
in.. .construction, maintenance, or operation").
104 United States v. James, 478 U.S. at 605.
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relation to flood control a system or activity can have before immunity
applies. 105
Many of the plaintiffs in early Katrina-related lawsuits against
the government have been shaping their complaints to avoid FCA
immunity.

In cases arising out of flooding in New Orleans during

Hurricane Betsy, the Fifth Circuit in 1971 found that because the city's
MR-GO was a navigable waterway and not part of the flood control
system, the government was not immunized by the FCA against claims
of negligence in its construction.' 06 Because the government appears to
lack immunity for its design, construction, and maintenance, using the
MR-GO to establish a chain of causation encompassing significant
portions of most devastated areas of New Orleans appears to be the
favored strategy in early suits.' 07 Arguments will probably be made for
the inapplicability of the FCA to other navigable waterways that seem
the flood control system, such as the Gulf Intracoastal
dissociated 0from
8
Waterway.1
Even if the sovereign immunity hurdle is cleared, a related
problem remains. Removing sovereign immunity simply clears the way
for a negligence suit, for example, to be brought, subject to all of the
requirements for a successful claim under the rules of that tort.
Principal among the problems the plaintiffs would face is whether the
government owed them a duty to protect them against the levees'
collapse. °9 If a duty were found and negligent acts were established
105

The Ninth Circuit, at the most extreme, has adopted the position that the

government retains immunity under the FCA unless an activity or project is "wholly
unrelated to any act of Congress authorizing expenditure of federal funds for flood
control." Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1982); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d at 1203. By contrast, the Fifth Circuit takes a factspecific approach which looks for a "sufficient association" between the activity and
flood control. Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1995)
(describing circuit split and Fifth Circuit standard).
106 Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 26-28 (5th Cir. 1971).
In Graci, the
Id.
waterway.
government conceded the MR-GO's status as navigable
107 Complaint, Peyroux v. United States, supra note 32; Complaint for Damages
Caused by the Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet, Robinson v. United States, supra note 32. See also supra Part
III.A.7 (discussing this issue).
108 The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, authorized by Congress in 1919, is a commercial
shipping corridor. ILIT, INVESTIGATION, supra note 37, at ch. 4, p. 26.
109 Although the issues of duty and sovereign immunity are closely related (in a sense,
a determination that the government enjoys such immunity is a ruling that there is no
duty owed the plaintiff), they are not identical. See Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d
474, 476 (Tex. App. 1999) ("application of an immunity from liability and the
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(as seems clear from the discussion in Part IJI.A., supra), causation
would still need to be established; depending on the particular harms a
plaintiff suffered, the causal link between misconduct and injury might
be impossible to prove, or too attenuated.
Whether the defendant owes a given plaintiff, or a class of
plaintiffs, a duty is a threshold question of law to be determined by a
court. Duty limitations may be broadly stated as of two types. The
first rule is that defendants generally have no positive duty to act to
prevent harm, but only to conduct their affairs so as not to affirmatively
cause harm. "10 The second limitation is more difficult to state because
it is unprincipled: Courts may, for a variety of reasons, decide that
overall policy would be better served by not holding defendants liable
for the injuries they cause. The first limitation presents a significant
obstacle to recovery in a number of possible Katrina-related lawsuits,
including the failure of cities or towns to rescue people or to provide
them with medical care once they had suffered injury. Recovery in
such cases might depend on the injured party's ability to show
reasonable reliance on government's promise to take specific steps.
But the rule of no liability for failing to act should not block claims
based on negligence related to the levees, because as shown in Part
II.A., supra, government did undertake this project; once it did so, it
had an obligation, in principle enforceable in tort law,"' to do so with
due care. And those entities not immune from liability might end up
shouldering a heavy burden if, as expected, the federal government is
not held accountable.
As for the grab bag of policy reasons that might be used to deny
recovery-too onerous a burden to impose on government, claims too
difficult to sort out, the benefits of compensating victims through some
other administrative mechanism-there is little to say besides repeating
the point that such justifications are unprincipled. These concerns,
however, need not be dismissed. They are better addressed somewhat
less directly by focusing on the different issues that arise when
government, as opposed to a private actor, is doing the compensating.
This issue will be discussed presently.
recognition of a legal duty that is the prerequisite to a civil cause of action are two
entirely separate issues").
10 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 853-857 (2000).
...This finding may be based on a theory of reliance, or on the principle that one
who undertakes a task (even without initial obligation to do so) is liable for failing to
exercise due care in the exercise of that task. See id. at 860-861 ('The general rule
that undertakings can create a duty of care is often expressed by saying one who
voluntarily assumes a duty must then perform that duty with reasonable care").
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Another potential obstacle to tort claims is establishing
causation. Many of the harms suffered because of the government's
negligence though would be easily established under prevailing notions
of legal and factual causation. To take perhaps the paradigm case:
Those whose homes were destroyed by the preventable breach of the
levees would have a simple case in showing property loss or loss of life
from the flood (both factually easy to demonstrate and eminently
"foreseeable"), and might face only slightly more difficulty in tracing
harms such as job loss, severe emotional distress, and mental illness to
the devastation wrought by prolonged or permanent displacement.
Laying out the elements of a basic tort claim begs the important
question, though: Should the government have the right or duty to
compensate the victims of specific misfortune, even where its own
actions cause the harm? And, if so, should such compensation be
through the tort system or through a September 11-type compensation
fund? To those questions this Article now turns.
2. Deeper Concerns with Tort Liability Against Government
Actors
At the outset, I note the following discussion of the appropriateness of
tort liability against the government for the events of Katrina focuses
on non-instrumental arguments. There are two reasons for this
approach. First, as noted earlier, tort needs to be theoretically
supported by appeal to intrinsic arguments, or it should be abandoned
in favor of a compensation system. But a second and more specifically
applicable problem surfaces in applying deterrence or efficiency
arguments to government actions: There is no good reason to suppose
that government responds to internalization of cost pressures in the
same way that private individuals or firms do. If tort law is thought to
deter unduly risky conduct, market theory presumes that a firm forced
to pay $1,000 in tort damages to victims will avoid doing so if the cost
of preventing this damage would be less than that amount.
Shareholders, as owners of the firm, will exert pressure on its agents to
12
avoid such behavior, so as to maximize their return on investment.'
But, as exhaustively demonstrated by Daryl J. Levinson, this
assumption has been little examined and is likely wrong. In an article
112

This account is perhaps too simplistic, as it seems to assume shareholder

monitoring of every firm action. But the underpinning of the explanation (at least
under efficiency market theory) is that the market price, at least for publicly traded
firms, will reflect the totality of material information about the firm.
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focusing on constitutional torts and takings, he notes: "[C]itizens... are
not uniquely interested in maximizing the profits, or total wealth, of the
jurisdiction. Unlike owners of private firm equity, who generally
receive a pro rata share of firm profits based on their ownership
interest, citizens have no similar expectation of equal economic
treatment." '"13 Aside from expectations, citizens qua citizens have
interests besides economic ones, including other kinds of self-interest
and concern about the well-being of others.' 4 Perhaps more fatal to
the assumption of fungibility between market and public sector forces
is the difference in accountability. Again, Levinson: "[B]ecause
control and selection mechanisms are much weaker in the political
sphere than in economic markets, we should expect the actions of
public agents as compared to private agent to diverge from their
principals' interests to a much greater extent." ' 5
We are thus brought back to corrective justice as the noninstrumentalist justification for compensating those injured by
wrongful conduct. But the theory is much more problematic when
applied to government action. First, note the lack of connection
between wrongdoing and causation, on the one hand, and the burden of
rectifying the imbalance, on the other. The wrongdoers are agents of
the government, not the larger group of taxpayers who ultimately bear
the burden of payment. It is of course possible to answer this criticism
with the observation that taxpayers vote (or have the right to vote) into
office those who commit the wrongful acts, just as shareholders can
direct the governance of the corporations in which they hold financial
interests, but this simple account fails to address the enormous agency
problems and costs involved in government action. Often it is
entrenched and politically unaccountable bureaucrats whose actions
cause harm. Katrina is a case on point here. The negligent design and
maintenance of the levee system was in part the fault of the Army
Corps of Engineers, hardly a group capable of being voted out of
office. Poor coordination among responsible parties and seeming
intransigence of local bureaucrats, detailed above, also contributed to
the disaster, but these parties may be similarly unaccountable.
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 355 (2000).
'3

114 Id.

15 Id. Levinson has a great deal more to say on the topic, including a thorough
discussion of how various explanations of government decision-making-models
including pursuit of the public interest, majority rule, interest group analysis, and
bureaucracy-only serve to highlight the difficulty of applying deterrence theory to
government action. Id. at 362-387.
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Even if this daunting agency problem could be solved, the
difficulty of separating distributive justice from corrective justice is
enormous here, because the government is responsible for "doing" both
kinds of justice in cases of government misconduct. This need to serve
dual purposes creates a tension because compensation for particular
acts of governmental misconduct will not necessarily bring society
closer to just distributions. Can government "suspend" distributive
considerations while doing corrective justice, as is done in cases
involving private actors? It is hard to see how this could be done
because compensation to particular victims of the hurricane (whoever's
to blame for their misfortune) will ipso facto readjust the overall
holdings of everyone.
One might attempt to address this problem by emphasizing the
division of labor between public and private law. Looking at the event
from a public law perspective: To the extent that Katrina itself caused a
distributionally unjust situation, compensating the victims through
taxpayer money is justified. This would be true as much for those also16
affected by government's negligence as for those not so affected.!
Thus, existing and supplemental statutes and regulations, as well as any
additional legislation thought necessary, would be the vehicles for
recovery. The difference between those affected by negligence and
those harmed only by Katrina itself (say, some of the residents of
Mississippi) would surface once the question of compensation were
Those affected by
addressed from a private law perspective.
negligence have legitimate claims in tort against only those parties who
have caused the wrong. Thus, compensation would be justified in this
corrective justice context only to the extent that negligence took
something away from one party (the plaintiff) and "gave" it to the other
(the defendant).
This move, though, submerges the problem without solving it.
The difficulty lies at the heart of corrective justice. Aristotle's
formulation of corrective justice works best when dealing with
commensurates: If A takes something from B, corrective justice
requires its return, or, if the item is destroyed, payment of its fair
market value. But most claims, and certainly most negligence claims,
116

Cf Levinson, supra note 113, at 406-07 (noting the implausibility of any theory of

distributive justice that would "single out" victims of governmental misconduct "as
uniquely entitled to government wealth transfers. What about the countless others
who suffer more severe losses as a result of other types of undeserved contingencies,
whether caused by government or not - for example[,] economic recessions, illnesses
or hurricanes?")(emphasis added).
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do not involve such simple exchanges. If C's negligent driving causes
harm to D, in what sense does making C pay D's medical bills and
(even more to the point) pain and suffering damages set right the
balance? What did C gain that she must now account for? As
suggested in Part II, supra, the gain is said to be in foregone
precautions. By driving without due care, C failed to treat D's interests
as equal to her own. It is this decision by C to "use up" D's resources
that justifies separating the two kinds of justice; the prudential division
of labor between public and private law is in a sense simply the
administrative way of doing so.
But what are we to say when government, acting through its
agents, acts in this self-regarding way? Whatever the gain (lack of time
spent focusing on better construction sites; poor construction;
lackadaisical maintenance, as examples), the "gainer" is the entire
population because those costs did not have to be borne by taxpayers.
And the victims are a subset of the tax-paying citizenry. So it seems
impossible to wall off distributive considerations in a way that the
private, bilateral tort system allows in other cases, where the imbalance
negligence creates can be rectified without disturbing other holdings.
There is no neat way out of this difficulty. In an earlier article, I
suggested that tort-like compensation for those injured by government
actions might be justified by positing consent to repay those harmed
through government's negligence, even though doing so affects the
non-injured population financially, through higher taxes."17 Statutes
that waive sovereign immunity, such as the Federal Torts Claims Act,
seem to support this consent argument. Perhaps one answer to the
difficulty of justifying tort liability when government is the defendant
is simply that "we" have decided to allow such compensation. Given,
though, that corrective justice is a poor fit for redressing harms caused
by government misconduct, perhaps a more creative and ultimately
better solution commends itself. In other words, we are not forced to
choose between applying either kind of justice in its "pure" form.
Drawing on recent scholarship that emphasizes tort law's practical
limitations in achieving corrective justice, the remarks that follow
sketch out a blueprint for doing the best we can for Katrina's victims117 See generally Culhane, Two Kinds of Justice, supra note 4. There could also be a

referendum on the issue, but this seems an unlikely event. In a representative
democracy, in principle whatever the government decides to spend on Katrina's
victims is by consent. The intervention of a vast bureaucracy and the lack of
accountability between the legislators and the administrators makes this consent
something of a fiction, however.
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but perhaps doing it for less money than would be spent in paying
successful tort claimants, and doing it through compensation instead of
requiring resort to the tort system.
The suggestions sketched out below should have other positive
effects, too. The volume of Katrina-related lawsuits has the potential to
create tremendous strain on the local court system, which, of course, is
not functioning at peak efficiency nowadays because of the hurricane.
Second, and more significantly, a careful but generous compensation
system that could be justified by appeal to principles of overall
distributional fairness would send a powerful message that might to an
extent change the dominant narrative of government's response to
Katrina's victims to date. The very simplicity of that narrative is its
power-Poor people, and particularly poor African-American people,
count for little.
IV. COMPENSATING KATRINA'S VICTIMS
What would constitute fair compensation for Katrina's victims? To
answer this question, we need a sense of what "compensation"
includes. We might begin by inquiring into the meaning of term as
used in tort law. But the answer is less than clear. As Professor Ellen
S. Pryor has noted, compensation has been insufficiently and to an
extent incorrectly theorized. The problem begins with the generally
accepted goal of compensation, which is to place the plaintiff in the
position she would have occupied had the injury not occurred.
Although this may be possible in simple cases (again, A steals
something of B's or negligently destroys it), a moment's reflection
shows the goal simply is not attainable in many if not most cases. For
example, what if the thing A destroyed was irreplaceable and of great
sentimental value to the plaintiff? In that case, whether or not we can
assign a market value to the item, money damages will fail to restore
the plaintiff to a pre-accident state. The problem is more acute in the
case of serious personal injury. Often the injured party will never be
the person she was before the harmful event and for many different
reasons. A healthy young person may now be unable to walk or only
able to do so haltingly or with assistance. Brain injuries may be wholly
or partly irremediable. Even where full physical functioning can be
restored, the pre-injury and post-injury person is not the same. The
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very fact of the harmful occurrence will change the plaintiff, and those
changes will evolve over the course of time. 118
If restoring the pre-accident plaintiff is often impossible, what
should be the goal of compensation? Professor Pryor has begun to
develop a model of compensation that focuses more on rehabilitation.
She notes that to the extent courts and litigants think about
19
rehabilitation, it is often with a limited medical model in mind.
Thus, a plaintiff might be considered rehabilitated when she has
regained a level of function that is considered medically adequate, even
though continued efforts might result in additional function. These
judgments are based on an often-unstated combination of deference to
the medical profession and a belief, not typically stated in normative
terms, that further rehabilitative efforts should not be undertaken if they
would only yield incremental benefits. 120 Other, more creative steps
that might be taken to rehabilitate the plaintiff in the fullest sense of the
word may not even be considered. For instance, if the plaintiff enjoyed
but can no longer engage in a competitive sport involving strategy
(such as tennis), perhaps bridge lessons would lead to participation in a
fulfilling substitute activity.
Professor Heidi Li Feldman has also developed this richer idea
of compensation, beginning with the same insight that a monetary
judgment "does not literally make [the plaintiff] whole. A fake arm, an
assistant, or any other surrogate for the victim's lost limb is.. .a
substitute, not a return to the actual status quo."' 2 1 She then draws on
Aristotle's notion of flourishing as the justification for compensation.
The concept is admittedly elusive, in part because of its inherent
But the concept contains an
subjectivity and pluralistic nature.
important insight for the present project of imagining what the lives of
They should be
New Orleans residents could look like, post-Katrina.
12 2
worth.
of
lives
lead
to
"opportunit[y]
the
given
Feldman focuses on money as a way to "foste[r] flourishing"
because it is "extremely versatile."' 123 This statement is doubtless true,
"The post-injury self often differs in crucial ways from the pre-injury self psychologically, cognitively, spiritually, emotionally, and rationally.... What she
values, what seems worthwhile, and in what order and with what weight, all may
greatly change." Pryor, supra note 13, at 670.
119 Id. at 666-669.
118

120
121

Id. at 676-680.
Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of

Compensation, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1567, 1580 (1997).
122 Id. at 1586.
123 Id. at 1588.
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but given the constraints of distributive justice, it is fair to husband the
actual monetary payments issued, and to focus more closely on
programs and payments with greater accountability. For example, jobtraining programs, urban revitalization initiatives, and direct homebuilding assistance (whether in the form of government-financed labor
or other voucher programs) seem well-suited to allowing Katrina's
survivors, many of whom are still displaced, to flourish in their posthurricane lives. But it is important to underscore Professor Pryor's
point that these lives will never be what they once were.
Government-funded compensation should be marked by at least
two advantages over the tort system (which, not incidentally, a wellconstructed program might largely supplant in these cases). First, the
program's creation should be preceded by fact-finding, including
extensive interviews with survivors. Doing so would lay bare their
anger and frustration, their pain and desperation. Solutions that fail to
take these natural emotional responses into account are bound to fall
short. Second, the program should be of long duration, thus providing
the survivors with a renewable and flexible source of assistance as their
lives and circumstances change. Some "trial and error" should be built
in.
As to specifics: For those who lived in New Orleans before
Katrina, any compensation system faces daunting obstacles, and no
perfect solution is possible. An obvious place to start is with rebuilding
the homes that were destroyed. Although the usual cap on governmentfunded housing replacement payments is justified in most situations,
here the payments should be sufficient to rebuild. 24 But what are the
residents returning to? Stories abound of the difficulty in living in a
city where basic public and private services are absent or inadequate.
Thus, insofar as local government lacks resources, a national
commitment to supporting the city as it struggles to regain its basic
124

This is not to say that other sources of money available to the displaced should not

be considered in appropriate cases. Insurance coverage through the National Flood
Insurance Plan is available to those who had paid the premiums. One report
estimated that 64.4% of Louisiana homes flooded in 2005 were covered by the NFIP.
Jeffrey Meitrodt & Rebecca Mowbray, After Katrina, Pundits Criticized New
Orleans, Claiming Too Many Residents Had No Flood Insurance, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 19, 2006, at 1. The cap on payment is $250,000. NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PLAN: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, at 25, available at
http://www.fema.gov/doc/plan/prevent/floodplain/nfipdescrip.doc
(last
visited
Sept.26, 2006). Where such coverage, such as private insurance, is available, the
continuing demands of distributive justice suggest that it be used as a primary source
of recovery.
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infrastructural support is vital. As for private businesses, a creative
program of enterprise zones, job retraining, and (in the short run, at
least) bringing goods and services into "depleted" areas would
constitute positive movement.
Again, though, it will be important to listen to the stories the
survivors are telling. Some of what may well be needed has to do with
restoring confidence that the poorer residents of New Orleans count as
citizens. Thus, making sure that people have the ability to vote (even
when they remain displaced) may be especially vital. Indeed, the
failure to provide any such access for the recent mayoral election
served only to deepen the sense that federal government was125simply not
concerned about those whose harm they had in part caused.
New Orleans will not be reconstructed quickly and will never
be quite the city it was. The status quo ante is even less imaginable
here than in the case of a personal injury victim. Nonetheless, a welldesigned compensation program can revitalize the city and restore hope
to its inhabitants. While civil suits render judgment and then have done
with the parties, 126 a broadly imagined and executed compensation
scheme can flexibly account for changing circumstances. For example,
it may turn out that many flood victims will need psychiatric care far
into the future. A program that declines to impose a time limit on such
care is not troubled by this development.
Nonetheless, no such program can fully fix what Katrina and
the government's ineptitude have wrought. The practical problems
with compensation, as well as the theoretical difficulties it raises,
compel more serious attention to planning and prevention. The reports
that have come forward already indicate that much of the suffering seen
in the hurricane's aftermath was preventable. While much of the
attention has appropriately focused on the failure to evacuate many of
those in Katrina's path, even a well-oiled evacuation and rescue effort
would not have saved thousands of homes and businesses. A betterdesigned and maintained hurricane protection system would have been
needed for that. Yet we have been slow to learn the lessons of Katrina;
by all accounts, the levee system would again fail in the face of a storm
For a summary of the problems (with a link to a more extensive document), see
(last
Civilrights.org, http://newreconstruction.civilrights.org/details.cfm?id=46496
visited Sept. 26, 2006).
126 As noted earlier, there has been some move towards structured payments. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text. But the overall amount of money to be paid
does not change even when post-judgment facts prove the judgment to have been
much too high or low.
125
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of similar magnitude. The residents of the Gulf Coast, and all of us,
have a right to demand better, whatever the cost.
V. CONCLUSION
Chosen from among many, one survivor's tale may serve to put a
human face on the need for collective recognition that the residents of
New Orleans deserve more than our sympathy. Michael Knight was a
44-year-old tow-truck driver from the unforgettably named Flood
Street in the Lower Ninth Ward. His heroism in the aftermath of
Katrina was well-chronicled: He and two relatives searched his
neighborhood by boat for those stranded and did this nearly a full day
before the Coast Guard arrived. 127 After several days living between
the boats and Knight's roof, the men had rescued an estimated four
hundred people. Perhaps more could have been rescued, but, according
to Knight, the Coast Guard refused his request for a drop-off plan that
28
would have enabled him to bring larger numbers of people to safety. 1
Interviewed after evacuating to Atlanta, Knight acknowledged
that his neighborhood was "gone," but said he wanted to return, even
though his new home-finished 29one year earlier, after twenty-five
years of saving-was underwater.
By June 2006, Knight was back on Flood Street-in an area
which remained officially restricted and was filled with destroyed
houses and debris-and had nearly finished rebuilding his house, with a
sign outside welcoming visiting and returning residents. Knight had to
rebuild almost entirely with his own labor and out of his own funds,
salvaging and washing materials from the original structure. Like
many Katrina victims, Knight is angry over the lack of official help
both during and after the hurricane. And as one of a smaller group of
people who remained in New Orleans to help others escape, the mental
and emotional trauma of30survivorship are compounded by memories of
those he could not save.'
127 Cheryl Corley, All Things Considered: Emotional Scars Still Haunt Katrina

Survivors
(NPR
radio
broadcast,
June
14,
2006),
available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5485268 (last visited Sept. 6,
2006); Frank Etheridge, Last of the Ninth, SALON.COM, Sept. 13, 2005,
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/09/13/ninth/index.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2006).
128 Corley, supra note 127.
129 As he stated: "I don't want to be here.. .I don't want to make new friends. I don't
want to look for a new job. I want to be home." Etheridge, supra note 127.
130 Corley, supra note 127.

2007]

WHAT JUSTICE REQUIRES

211

Any effort to compensate the hurricane's victims should have in
mind Michael Knight, and many thousands like him. Tort recovery is
likely unavailable, and neither the best practical nor theoretical fit in
any case. A well-devised compensation plan can better approach the
requirements of distributive justice, sending the powerful message that
we stand-if belatedly-with those whose lives were forever changed
by Katrina.
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